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Modelling and knowledge transfer in complexity science 
 
1.  Introduction 
Since its inception in the late 1980s, complexity science has evolved into a well-established 
and highly popularized area of science (e.g., for a description of the field’s history, Mitchell, 
2009). The exploration of complexity has been connected to a number of foundational claims, 
ranging from a redefinition of the arrow of time (e.g. Davies, 2003) to the often quoted 
slogan, ‘more is different’ by Anderson (1972). Such foundational claims have generated 
much philosophical debate (e.g. Kauffman, 1993; Coveney and Highfield, 1995; Frigg, 2003; 
Bedau and Humphreys, 2008; Hooker, 2011).  
However, a survey of the existing philosophical literature (e.g., for collections of 
philosophical works on complexity science, Gregersen, 2003; Hooker, 2011) shows that there 
are few works that focus on analysing the actual work of practitioners in the field.  
This paper aims to address the lack of philosophical analyses of the methodology of 
complexity science and to provide a detailed account of one crucial aspect of the work of 
complexity scientists, namely the construction and transfer of complex models. The 
philosophical literature on modelling in the natural sciences has traditionally been focussed on 
the construction of these models from both empirical knowledge about a particular target 
system as well as the general theory that governs this system (e.g. Frigg and Hartmann, 2012; 
Toon, 2012). I will call this kind of model construction ‘vertical construction’. In recent years, 
the existence of other kinds of model construction has also been highlighted, including the 
construction of models through the alteration of existing models (Bokulich, 2003), which I 
will henceforth denote as ‘horizontal construction’, and the transfer of models from one target 
system to another (e.g. Hesse, 1966; Bokulich, 2014, 2015). Some studies on the transfer of 
models have been based on case studies of complex models (Bokulich, 2014). However, to 
my knowledge, there exist no studies that provide integrated accounts of the interplay of 
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different modelling activities in complexity science. My study here aims to provide such an 
account.  
The paper has two main theses: (i) I will argue that all three modelling activities 
described above, i.e. vertical construction of models; horizontal construction of models; and 
the transfer of models to new target systems, can be identified in complexity science; and (ii) 
that the interplay of these activities is structured in a particular way. In particular, with respect 
to thesis (ii), I will argue that the modelling activities in complexity science can be divided 
into two categories: the creation of a repository of general models through large-scale 
horizontal modelling; and the transfer of these models to particular target systems, which can 
be combined with an extension of the transferred models through additional vertical 
constructions. This division is not just one between activities but also one between epistemic 
fields: the creation of the repository is mainly undertaken by computational scientists and 
mathematicians while the transfer and extension of models takes place in the natural and 
social sciences. Accordingly, this interplay between different modelling activities provides a 
mechanism through which knowledge is transferred between different scientific communities.  
Furthermore, my identification of this division of the modelling activities in complexity  
science can be used to derive a methodological definition of the field of complexity science 
itself. Namely, the field seems to consist of a core area that can be defined methodologically 
as comprising those activities that contribute to the creating, cataloguing and investigation of 
the repository of models without fixed target systems and of a number of auxiliary areas that 
overlap with other disciplines and that can be methodologically defined as the use of models 
from the repository to investigate phenomena located in these other areas. This definition of 
the field of complexity science based on the crucial methodologies used by scientists that self-
identify as complexity scientists (i) avoids relying on the currently not unequivocally defined 
term ‘complexity’ and (ii) allows for the fact that a large number of complexity scientists also 
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have strong associations to other fields, which has contributed to the difficulties in delineating 
the field.  
The methodological definition offered here is clearly neither the only possible definition 
of the field (e.g., in the context of emergence in complexity science, a division into three 
schools has been offered by Richardson & Cilliers, 2001) nor will it be able to offer a 
demarcation criterion that allows an unequivocal assignation of a given investigation or a 
given scientist as belonging to the field of complexity science or being a complexity scientist. 
Furthermore, by defining complexity science through the structure of its modelling activities, 
important parts of the field that could also be viewed as definitional (e.g. metaphorical 
descriptions, slogans and conceptual definitions) are neglected. However, a delineation of the 
field that includes all of these parts has so far not been possible. The methodological 
definition offered here can therefore be viewed as a preliminary definition: a later 
construction of a more comprehensive definition might find it to be a good starting point.   
Furthermore, I hope to show that the methodological definition identifies a large 
number of activities as being part of complexity science and thereby also provides a clearer 
exposition of the work conducted by researchers in the field. As explained above, it also 
reflects the fact that there seem to be two classes of complexity scientists: those  
who primarily self-identify as such (e.g. Stephen Wolfram, section 4.1) and those who 
profess to work with complex models but to primarily belong to an existing field of science 
(e.g. Michael Batty, section 4.2).  
It should be noted that the transfer of models in the auxiliary regions of complexity 
science is not restricted to the transfer of models from the repository to a particular target 
system. Within these regions, models are also transferred from one target system to another. 
This transfer often crosses disciplinary boundaries and, in doing so, seems to have a preferred 
direction: in many cases, these transfers consist in the adaptation of a natural science model 
for a target system in the social science. Such cross-disciplinary transfers of models – in 
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complexity science and elsewhere – have recently been investigated by several authors (e.g. 
Chettiparamb, 2006; Bokulich, 2014; Thebault et al., 2017). Since the focus of this paper is 
the horizontal construction of models and their subsequent transfer, I will not discuss this 
second transfer mechanism with the same detail. I also maintain that the creation of a 
repository of models and their subsequent transfer is one of the most distinguishing features 
of complexity science, while the transfer of models from one target system to another also 
takes place in other fields (e.g. Thebault et. al., 2017). However, it is clearly an important part 
of the methodology of complexity science and – as I will describe below – also plays a crucial 
role in the structuring of its auxiliary regions.   
I also maintain that it is through this structuring of modelling activities and the resulting 
overlap with other disciplines that complexity science becomes an interdisciplinary field. As 
foreshadowed in the description above, I will argue that the defining methodology of 
complexity science includes the transfer of models into many different areas of the natural 
and social sciences. The adaption and use of these models could be viewed as auxiliary areas 
of complexity science: areas that are methodologically connected to the field as being part of 
the interplay of different modelling activities, but whose phenomena under investigation are 
traditionally part of another area of science. Accordingly, the term ‘interdisciplinary’ can be 
given a more precise meaning in this context: it denotes the fact that the methodological core 
area of complexity science, the stocking, investigation and cataloguing of the repository of 
models, is connected with many different disciplines through the transfer of these models to 
different target systems.  
Furthermore, the cross-disciplinary transfer of models within the auxiliary regions 
further increases the overlap of complexity science with other fields by providing bridges to 
additional parts of the natural and social sciences. Given that the directionally of such cross-
disciplinary transfers generally seems to be from the natural sciences to the social sciences 
(e.g. Thebault et al., 2017), the picture that seems to emerge is one in which areas of the 
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natural sciences are primarily tied to central repository of models through the transfer of 
horizontally generated models, while areas of the social sciences are then added to the 
auxiliary regions of complexity science through the subsequent transfer of such models from 
a natural science target system to a social science target system. This interpretation is 
dependent on the classification of different branches of science as ‘natural’ and ‘social’; in 
some cases, including the field of urban planning, which provides one of my major case 
studies (Section 4), such a classification is not easily performed. Furthermore, there are also 
cases in which a model has been transferred directly from the repository into a social science 
field (e.g., into linguistics, Lansing & Downey, 2011). As explained above, the focus of this 
paper is on the former mechanism; however, the cross-disciplinary transfer of models from 
the natural to the social sciences is clearly another important methodological feature of 
complexity science.   
As far as I am aware, the identification and analysis of this interplay of modelling 
activities is a novel contribution to the philosophical discussion of complexity science.  
In Section 2, I will review some relevant material on different kinds of model 
construction. As outlined above, I will distinguish between vertical (Section 2.1) and 
horizontal (Section 2.2) model construction.  
In Section 3, I will discuss the transfer of models to new target systems. The framework 
for this discussion will be an adaptation of the analogy-based account of model transfer by 
Hesse (1966).  
In Section 4, I will analyse the interplay of different modelling activities in complexity 
science. I will first introduce the kind of models that are prevalent in complexity science. I 
will then show that a division of modelling activities into the two categories mentioned above, 
i.e. the creation of a repository of models (Section 4.1); and the transfer and extension of 
models from this repository (Section 4.2), is supported by an analysis of both the actual 
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interplay of models in complexity science as well as the representations of this interplay by 
practitioners.   
 
2.  Vertical and horizontal model construction 
Models and their uses in science have been the subject of a prolific and ongoing debate in the 
philosophy of science (e.g., for review, Frigg and Hartmann, 2012). Much of the 
philosophical debate on modelling focuses exclusively on one particular kind of modelling 
practiced by natural scientists. According to Bokulich (2003, p. 610), the prototypical model 
ascribed to these scientists is a ‘vertical’ one: a model that has been constructed “either top-
down from theory or bottom up from empirical data”.  
I maintain that the models used in complexity science are not exclusively vertical ones. 
Rather, many complex models are horizontally constructed. Bokulich (2003, p. 611) describes 
horizontal models as models that are not constructed vertically from theory or empirical data 
but are horizontal spin-offs from existing models. I do not wish to claim that horizontal and 
vertical model construction are the only modes of model construction in all fields of sciences. 
However, my analysis of complexity science shows that they seem to be the two modes of 
model construction that exist in this field.  
In Section 2.1, I will discuss the vertical construction of models. Given the large amount 
of literature available on this kind of model construction, this review will be relatively brief. 
In Section 2.2, I will give a general account of the horizontal construction of models. I have 
provided extended reviews of the existing material on the construction of horizontal and 
vertical models in Zuchowski (2017).   
 
2.1  Vertical model construction 
Construction of vertical models  Vertical model construction has been studied extensively 
(e.g. Toon, 2012, Cartwright, 1983). Thereby, the model is constructed from the vast amount 
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of top-level theories that govern the processes underlying the target system by an appropriate 
combination of selections, idealizations and simplifications. This ‘pruning’ process is guided 
by bottom-level empirical knowledge about the target system; such knowledge allows the 
identification of the appropriate selection of laws, of suitable idealizations and of allowed 
simplifications. Accordingly, vertical models are constructed from both top-level theory as 
well as bottom-level empirical knowledge about the target system. The degree to which each 
level is involved in the construction can vary in each individual instance (e.g. ‘bottom-up’ vs 
‘top-down’ construction). However, the resulting vertical model always constitutes a 
mediation between the covering theories and the existing empirical knowledge of the target 
system.  
  
Explanatory function of vertical models   The major epistemic role ascribed to 
vertical models is being informative about their target systems (e.g. Bolinska, 2013). The 
evaluation of a model therefore entails judging how trustworthy information gained from the 
model is in guiding our knowledge of, and expectations about, the target system. 
Bokulich (2014) thereby distinguishes between `how actually’ and `how possibly’ 
explanations. `How possibly’ explanations are thereby defined as:  
“[T]hey show how a particular mechanism could, under certain circumstances which 
may or may not obtain, produce the effect of interest. For many complex phenomena 
this is a significant step forward, which can then be used as a basis from which further 
testable predictions can be made”.  
According to Bokulich (2014, p. 324), practitioners will be willing to accept a ‘how possibly’ 
explanation as a ‘how actually’ explanation if sufficient evidence exits that the proposed 
mechanism actually operates in the model’s target system.  
 
2.2. Horizontal model construction 
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Bokulich (2003, pp. 612) begins her study with a description of how models in the field of 
semi-classical physics are constructed: by discretizing the equations of a particular classical 
model. Thereby, the question of how the original model itself was constructed is unimportant; 
no information about its governing theory and its target system needs to be transmitted. The 
initial model merely provides a set of equations, which are mathematically manipulated to 
provide the new horizontal model. Through this process of construction, horizontal models 
become “part of a lineage of models with their own internal dynamics and justification” 
(Bokulich, 2003, p. 613). Thereby, the alterations to the model should be genuine structural 
changes, i.e. horizontal model construction should go beyond the mere systematic changing of 
a parameter in the model. While there might be cases in which the distinction between the 
exploration of a model’s parameter space and the horizontal construction of a new model 
might become blurred, the cases of horizontal modelling discussed in this paper seem to be 
relatively clear-cut examples of the structural alterations envisioned by Bokulich (2003).   
Zuchowski (2017) identifies similar lineages of horizontal and vertical models in chaos  
theory. It should be noted that the fact that chaos theory and complexity science both feature 
horizontal modelling does not imply that chaos and complexity are conceptually similar 
(Section 4).  
In the examples discussed by Bokulich (2003) and Zuchowski (2017), the construction 
of horizontal models proceeds without reference to any natural target system and no such 
system could be (directly) assigned to these models. I take this lack of reference to a target 
system to be characteristic of horizontal model construction. Therefore, I come to a different 
classification of two further scenarios labelled ‘horizontal model construction’ by Bokulich 
(2014, p. 327) and Bokulich (2015, p. 29). These studies analyse the use of models originally 
developed to model physical and chemical phenomena to represent the development of striped 
vegetation, and the use of hydrodynamic models to represent electrodynamical phenomena, 
respectively. The assignment of these models to their new target systems thereby rests on the 
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identification of analogies between the phenomena (as originally discussed by Hesse, 1966). 
In this study, I find it useful to distinguish between these scenarios, which I consider forms of 
model transfer (Section 3), and those of purely mathematical construction, which proceed 
without reference to a target system (as discussed above), which I consider examples of 
horizontal model construction. 
I am happy to concede that this distinction has been made for practical reasons. There is 
prima facie no reason to not use ‘horizontal modelling’ as a summary term that includes 
model transfer as an activity of model construction. Both horizontal model construction in the 
sense outlined above and model transfer in the sense of the scenarios described by Bokulich 
(2014, 2015) clearly differ from the vertical construction of models (Section 2.1). However, 
in the context of complexity science, I find it useful to distinguish clearly between these two 
activities since the demarcation between these two modelling activities also appears to be one 
of the natural epistemic fault lines of the field.  
 
Investigative function of horizontal models  Bokulich (2003, p. 613) assigns horizontal 
models an investigative function: e.g., in the case of semi-classical physics, they are a means 
of investigating relationships between classical and quantum theories. I agree with Bokulich 
(2003) that horizontal models have an investigative function rather than one of mediating 
between theory and data. However, I take this function to be both more general, as well as 
more subject-specific, than that of investigating inter-theoretical relationships. Horizontal 
models in chaos theory often appear to be designed with the explicit aim of gaining more 
information about specific other chaotic models, usually with the aim of establishing the 
sufficient conditions under which this model will behave chaotically (Zuchowski, 2017). In 
other words, they can be instrumental in establishing ‘how possibly’ explanations for a given 
phenomenon.  
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3.  Model transfer and reinterpretation 
In this section, I will discuss the process of model transfer. I will apply this label to any 
scenario in which a fully-fledged model is assigned to a new target system. The cases of 
model transfer discussed in the existing literature are usually scenarios of reassignment, i.e. a 
model that was previously used as a representation of a specific target system is now assigned 
to another target system.  
The most influential analysis of model transfer to date is Hesse’s (1966) account of the 
transfer of the model of the propagation of water waves to the propagation of acoustic waves 
and of light waves. Recently, a more historically oriented analysis of this example of model 
transfer has been provided by Bokulich (2015). None of these authors explicitly identifies this 
scenario as a case of model transfer; the focus of these two studies is on the identification of 
analogies between natural phenomena and models. However, I maintain that the derivation of 
the acoustic and electrodynamic wave model from the hydrodynamic wave model is a case of 
model transfer and can be analysed as such.  
Hesse’s (1966) account of the transfer of the wave model to different target systems is 
based on the identification of analogies between these systems. Hesse (1966, p. 11) provides a 
table of such analogies for the transfer of the ‘wave model’ from hydrodynamics (where it 
represents water waves) to acoustics (where it represents sound waves) to electrodynamics 
(where it represents light waves): the crest height of a water wave, the loudness of a sound 
wave and the brightness of a light wave are all represented by the same term in the model’s 
formalism, i.e., the amplitude, and are therefore analogous to each other. A similar 
correspondence can be established between the spatial distance between water waves, the 
pitch of sound waves and the colour of light waves; or between the medium of propagation 
(water, air, ‘ether’).  
The fact that the initial transfer of the ‘wave model’ involves the postulation of ‘ether’ 
as a medium for light waves shows that this mechanism should not be seen as a methodology 
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for picking out ontological features of a phenomenon. Furthermore, Bokulich (2015, pp. 32-
34) shows that the assignment of analogies is not unique: she outlines how Maxwell and 
Helmholtz each constructed different analogies between hydrodynamic and electrodynamic 
waves. The use of analogies in modelling is therefore usually interpreted as an investigative 
tool rather than an absolute assertion about the properties of the natural systems under 
investigation. Nevertheless, both Hesse (1966, e.g. p. 14) and Bokulich (2015, pp. 3-26) stress 
the epistemic usefulness of the transfer of a model through the identification of analogies: 
Hesse (1966) views this reassignment of the model as part of the development of the general 
theory governing the new target system while Bokulich (2015) discusses the fact that the 
assignment of the model allows the positing of ‘how possibly’ explanations for the behaviour 
of the new target system (Section 2.1). 
Interpreting the reassignments of the wave model as a process of model transfer, it is 
important to note that Hesse (1966, p. 12) states that the transfer is initiated by the recognition 
of phenomenological analogies:  
“So far we have two sources of information to aid our construction of theories for sound 
and for light, namely, their observed properties and their observed analogies with water 
waves, and it is important to notice that both of them appeal only to descriptions of 
“observable” events. We may define observation statements as those descriptive 
statements whose truth or falsity in the face of given empirical circumstance would be 
agreed upon by all users of English with or without scientific training”.  
In other words, the process of model transfer and reinterpretation is prompted by the 
recognition of phenomenological similarities between water, sound and light waves. It is 
notable that this initial recognition does not require any ‘scientific training’, i.e., no 
knowledge of the underlying dynamics of either phenomenon is necessary to recognize the 
phenomenological similarities between them. While the subsequent discussion between 
Hesse’s (1966, pp. 12-15) ‘Campbellian’ and ‘Duhemist’ makes it clear that recognizing the 
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analogies between these phenomena requires the existence of at least a rudimentary 
interpretative framework (e.g. that of wave propagation), Hesse (1966) maintains that no 
comprehensive knowledge of the specific dynamics underlying the phenomena is required to 
recognize analogies on an observational level. Bokulich’s (2015) historical analysis of the 
recognition of (different!) analogies by Maxwell and Helmholtz also supports the view that 
model transfer begins with a recognition of analogies between the behaviour of a model (and 
its currently assigned target system) and the behaviour of the target system it will eventually 
be transferred to. The analogies she lists (e.g. Figures 3 and 4 in her paper) are between 
observational properties in the Hessian sense, e.g., between the rotation visible in fluid and 
the lines of magnetic force (which can easily be made visible even to the untrained observer).  
I will call this step in the transfer process ‘phenomenological prompting’. 
Phenomenological prompting is the recognition that the phenomenology of the model under 
consideration can be reinterpreted to provide an analogous description of the phenomenology 
of the intended target system. While Hesse (1966) assumes that the identification of analogies 
will be between the phenomenologies of the models’ target systems, I see no reason to not 
extend this process to the phenomenologies of a model and a new target system. Accordingly, 
phenomenological prompting can also initiate the transfer of a horizontally constructed model 
to a specific target system. 
Both Hesse (1966, pp. 13-14) as well as Bokulich (2015, e.g. pp. 29-20) also make it 
clear that once the transfer has been prompted by the recognition of phenomenological 
analogies, scientists then proceed by finding more analogies on the dynamical level, i.e., by 
reinterpreting the dynamics of the existing model to fit the physics of the new target system. 
In the case of water, sound and light waves, Hesse (1966, p. 13-14) takes this to mean that 
researchers then reinterpret the wave equation, which is known to govern the dynamics of 
water waves, in terms of sound and light properties, i.e., they reinterpret the amplitude of this 
equation as loudness and brightness, respectively. From this follows the recognition that the 
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dynamics of all three phenomena are governed by approximately the same set of laws, namely 
those that have this wave equation as a solution. This step is also stressed by Bokulich (2015, 
pp. 30), who defines the kind of analogy eventually found by Maxwell and Helmholtz as “a 
resemblance in the form of the equations between what are otherwise different sorts of 
phenomena”.  
I will call this step in the transfer process ‘dynamical reinterpretation’. Dynamical 
reinterpretation is the reinterpretation of a model’s equations in terms of the intended new 
target system. The end result of this step in the transfer process is a fully-reinterpreted model, 
i.e., a model for the new target system. The transfer of a model can therefore be seen as a two-
step process of phenomenological prompting followed by dynamical reinterpretation. This 
process can be completed both for a model with pre-assigned target system (e.g., the wave 
model) and for a model without pre-assigned target system (i.e., a horizontally constructed 
model). 
I do not wish to claim that these two steps are the only possible way to break down the 
transfer process. Furthermore, I suspect that this process might also be subject-specific and 
therefore only wish to claim that the two-step interpretation provides a good framework for 
the analysis of model transfer in complexity science. In particular, the strong emphasis by 
both practitioners and philosophers (e.g. Wolfram, 2002; Batty, 2005; but also, Dennett, 
1991) on the recognition and matching of patterns in the phenomenology of complex systems 
makes this distinction a natural one. In other fields of science, a different rational 
reconstruction might be more suitable. However, in Section 4.2, I hope to demonstrate the 
merits of this analytic framework by showing that it allows me to give a clear exposition of 
the transfer of models in complexity science. 
 
Explanatory function of transferred models  Once the process of model transfer is 
completed, the transferred model is treated as a representation of its new target system. 
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Accordingly, the epistemic function of transferred models is the same as those of vertically 
constructed models (Section 2.1): to be informative about their target systems. In Section 2.1, 
I have analysed this function as the provision of ‘how possibly’/‘how actually’ explanations 
(Bokulich, 2014). 
However, I agree with Bokulich (2014) that explanations provided by transferred 
models are – at least initially – more likely to be treated as mere ‘how possibly’ explanations 
than those provided by vertically constructed models. This is primarily due to the fact that the 
transfer process is motivated by phenomenological prompting: while it is therefore guaranteed 
that the model is able to reproduce the desired phenomenological features, there is no 
guarantee that the reinterpreted dynamics of the model are representations of the mechanisms 
actually operating in the target system.  
Accordingly, transforming a ‘how possibly’-explanation into a ‘how 
actually’explanation requires more work for transferred models than for vertically constructed 
ones. Bokulich (2014) maintains that this work consists in the gathering of additional 
empirical evidence. In Section 4.2, I will show that in complexity science there exists another 
method to ensure that the dynamics of a transferred model matches those of its new target 
system (in all relevant aspects): the subsequent vertical construction of additions and 
adaptions to such a model. 
 
4.  Modelling in complexity science 
In this section, I will discuss the interplay of different modelling activities in complexity 
science. In particular, I will argue that these activities can be divided into two distinct 
categories: (i) the creation of a repository of models without fixed target systems through 
large-scale horizontal model construction; and (ii) the transfer of these models to specific 
target systems and their subsequent extension through vertical modelling. In Sections 4.1 and 
4.2, respectively, these two aspects of modelling in complexity science will be discussed in 
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detail. A third mechanism, which is the transfer of models from one target-system to another, 
also operates in the auxiliary regions of complexity science but will not be discussed in detail 
in this paper (Section 1).  
This structure of the interplay of different modelling activities in complexity science 
will be demonstrated during the detailed discussions of each category. However, it is can also 
be discerned in the representations of modelling in complexity science by practitioners. In 
particular, textbook-type works aiming at given an overview of the field are usually divided 
into two parts: (i) one that discusses the construction and evaluation of a large number of 
models without fixed target systems (e.g., Wolfram, 2002, Chapter 2–5; Casti, 1992a); and 
(ii) one that discusses the assignment of these models to different specific target systems (e.g., 
Wolfram, 2002, Chapter 8–1; Casti, 1992b). Part (i) is occasionally described as introducing 
the ‘methodology’ or ‘technology’ of complexity science. While there is no reason to object 
to this labelling, a closer look at such works shows that a significant part of the 
methodological tools presented are actually particular models, which have been constructed 
by the methodologies discussed in Section 4.1.  
 
Models in complexity science  Due to the currently unresolved question of how 
‘complexity’ should be defined, the kind of models that are seen as part of complexity science 
differ between different authors. In particular, some authors (e.g., Casti, 1992a) view chaos 
theory as a subfield of complexity science and included chaotic models in this set. In 
Zuchowski (2012), I argue that chaos is conceptually different from complexity theory and 
that chaos theory is based on different methodologies than complexity science. Furthermore, 
in Section 4.1, I will argue that not all models that are used by practitioners in complexity 
science - defined methodologically as being constituted by the characteristic interplay of 
modelling activities (Section 1) - also carry the label ‘complex’ since this label is primarily 
used as a phenomenological descriptor. 
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My methodological definition of complexity science (Section 1) leads to a 
straightforward formal identification of the class of complex models: this class can be defined 
as all models being part of the modelling activities analysed in this section. However, once 
the characteristic modelling activities have been analysed, it becomes clear that the models 
involved usually share a similar dynamical set-up, namely they tend to be many-component 
models with relatively simple deterministic or probabilistic dynamics. This definition includes 
cellular automata (CAs), agent-based models (ABMs) and network models, which also appear 
to be the types of models that are most robustly classified as being part of complexity science 
(e.g., Casti, 1992a; Wolfram, 2002; Ladyman et al., 2013; Zuchowski, 2012). For the purpose 
of this paper, it is not necessary to define the class of complex models more precisely. 
However, it should be stressed that the label ‘complex’ here (and within the canon of 
literature on complexity science) does not have the colloquial connotation of 
‘complicatedness’, i.e., the models involved in complexity science are not models with a 
complicated formal structure or ones for which many parameters or variables need to be 
specified. In fact, it appears to be precisely the relative simplicity of these models that renders 
them ideal for the large-scale horizontal construction and the transfer to different target 
systems, i.e., for the modelling activities that constitute complexity science.  
Since the dynamics of complex models are relatively simple, they can be taken to be 
highly explanatory (Batterman and Rice, 2014). In the framework of analysis introduced in 
Section 2.1, it will therefore be possible to consider the whole dynamics of a model as an 
explanation for a given behaviour or, framed in terms of a conditional to be transferred, to see 
the full dynamics as a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the phenomenon under 
investigation. A study focused on analysing the explanatory role of complex models would 
clearly need to adopt a more nuanced view. However, for the purpose of this study, which 
aims to be comprehensive rather than detailed, this simplified view of the explanatory 
function of complex models is fully sufficient.  
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The two case studies (Wolfram, 2002; Batty, 2005) I will use to illustrate the two 
modelling activities in complexity science, i.e., the creation of a repository of models, and the 
transfer and extension of these models, both extensively use CAs. I will therefore briefly 
outline this type of complex model in more detail.  
CAs are discrete-time, multi-component models that operate on a grid. Each cell on the 
grid can assume two or more states: in a binary cellular automaton these are usually given the 
values 0 and 1, or ‘dead’ and ‘alive’. At each time step, the state of a cell is updated according 
to a set of transition rules. These rules usually depend on the states of the neighbouring cells 
during the previous time step. The cells that influence the behaviour of a given cell are called 
the ‘neighbourhood’ of that cell. The number of possible rule sets to govern the behaviour of 
the cells depends on the size and shape of the neighbourhood and on the number of states a 
cell can assume.  
The dynamics of CAs are therefore their rule sets. Their behaviour can be visualized 
through a coloration of cells according to their state, e.g., by representing ‘alive’ cells as black 
and ‘dead’ cells as white. Such representations allow the visual display of patterns in the 
phenomenologies of CAs. In the case of two-dimensional CAs, the patterns identified are 
two-dimensional patterns, which may change with each time step. In the case of one-
dimensional CAs, the models’ outputs are usually plotted on a two-dimensional spatio-
temporal space. In this mode of representation, two-dimensional static patterns can be visually 
identified.  
Modified versions of CAs can be obtained by adding ‘agents’, i.e., entities that occupy 
and can move between cells on the grid, leading to agent-based models, or allowing 
connections between non-adjacent cells, leading to network models. These models are not the 
only ones in complexity science: in fact, extensions and adaptions of these models can lead to 
much more complicated models and can also include combinations of these classes of models 
with elements from different classes of models (Section 4.2). However, I maintain that these 
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are the classes of models which are most often involved in the large-scale horizontal 
construction (Section 4.1), and subsequent transfer to a target system (Section 4.1), of models 
that I have identified as constituting the most defining methodological mechanism of 
complexity science.   
 
4.1 Creation of a repository of models 
In this section, I will argue that a significant part of the modelling activities in complexity 
science is directed towards the creation of a repository of models without fixed target 
systems. This activity is best interpreted as the large-scale horizontal construction of models, 
i.e., the generation of many models with slightly different dynamics without reference to 
specific target systems. It should be noted that the ancestor model from which such 
constructions originate could be a model that has previously been used to model a given target 
system. In fact, the history of each class of models will likely be complicated (e.g., for an 
outline of the history of CAs, Batty, 2005, pp. 67-77). In this paper, I am only concerned with 
the large-scale horizontal construction of models as a methodology that is prevalent in 
complexity science (Section 1). I will identify two particular methodologies for this large-
scale horizontal model construction in complexity science: rule space parsing and the use of 
genetic algorithms.  
 
Rule space parsing   One of the clearest examples of rule space parsing is the work 
by Stephen Wolfram (e.g., Wolfram, 1983a, 1984, 2002). Wolfram (2002), entitled, A New 
Kind of Science, is a particularly good illustration of the methodology of rule space parsing 
and the large-scale horizontal construction of models in complexity science.  
The book contains an in-depth investigation of the dynamics and behaviour of CAs, 
AMs and network models. For example, Wolfram (2002, pp. 54-56) presents the output of all 
256 of possible one-dimensional, binary, nearest-neighbours CAs. These models are 
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constructed through the systematic generation and implementation of all possible rule sets,  
for which Wolfram (2002, p. 53) also develops a binary naming convention so that this 
process can be automated. I will call such a comprehensive construction of models ‘rule space 
parsing’. Rule space parsing is a particular kind of horizontal model construction (Section 
2.2): spin-offs from a given model are generated through systematic variation of its dynamics. 
In contrast to the cases of horizontal modelling found in semi-classical physics (Bokulich, 
2003) and chaos theory (Zuchowski, 2016), rule space parsing can be automated and therefore 
leads to the construction of long lineages of models with slightly different dynamics. The 
parsing of the binary, one-dimensional, nearest-neighbours CAs’ rule space is described as the 
“crucial experiment” by Wolfram (2002, e.g., p. 23); this large-scale horizontal construction 
of models clearly constitutes the heart of the book. In later chapters, Wolfram (2002) also 
constructs lineages of CAs with larger numbers of states and of agent-based models (Chapter 
3; Chapter 4); of models with rules that do depend on more complicated mathematical 
operations in the Moore neighbourhood of a cell (Chapter 4); and of multi-dimensional CAs, 
including network models, whose rule sets link cells that are not spatially adjacent (Chapter 
5).  
Each of these lineages of models is constructed through rule space parsing, i.e., through 
the process of labelling all possible rules constituting the dynamics of these models, followed 
by an automatic generation of these dynamics on the computer. It is particularly apparent in 
Wolfram (2002, Chapters 2–5) that the construction of these models is accomplished without 
any reference to possible target systems: as a matter of fact, it is prima facie not obvious that 
any of the dynamics generated in this manner have any relation to particular natural 
phenomena. Other parts of Wolfram (2002) discuss possible target systems to which these 
models could be transferred (Chapter 8–11). However, no knowledge about these target 
systems or the general theories governing them is needed for the construction of these models 
through rule space parsing.  
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While Wolfram (2002) is a particularly comprehensive exercise in model construction, 
rule space parsing is a prevalent methodology in complexity science. For example, another 
long-lineage of horizontally constructed models has been spun-off from the Game of Life, a 
two-dimensional CA initially envisioned as a mathematical game (e.g. Gardner, 1970; 
Dewdney, 2008).  
Accordingly, I maintain that (i) rule space parsing is a form of horizontal modelling and 
(ii) the use of this methodology constitutes a significant part of the modelling activity in 
complexity science. The result of the use of this methodology is the generation of a large 
number of models without specific target systems, which form part of a repository of complex 
models.  
 
Using genetic algorithms   In complexity science, genetic algorithms are usually 
discrete-time models on a discrete spatial grid whose rule sets can change according to a set 
of meta-rules. In particular, the meta-rule set is often one that forces the model to evolve 
towards a rule set that produces a particular phenomenology. Accordingly, genetic algorithms 
are models whose dynamics are adjusted algorithmically until the behaviour of the model fits 
a pre-set set of phenomenological criteria (e.g. Chambers, 1995).  
A prominent example of genetic modelling in complexity science is the work by 
Packard and Wolfram (1985) and Langton (1990). These authors also work with the one-
dimensional CAs studied by Wolfram (1983a, 1984, 2002).  
In contrast to rule space parsing, genetic modelling therefore constructs a model through 
a targeted process of dynamical adjustments. Langton (1990) introduces the concept while 
working on the so-called λ-parameterization of the CA rule space. Thereby, rules which 
heavily favour transitions to one particular phenomenological state (called the quiescent state) 
sc are assigned low λ values, while high values of λ indicate that very few configurations of 
the CA will lead to sc. By employing a set of meta-rules that updates the rule set of the model 
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at each time step with the aim of achieving particular λ values, Packard and Wolfram (1985) 
and Langton (1990) are able to associate specific dynamics with specific phenomenologies.  
More recent studies in genetic modelling do not just use meta-rule sets that evolve the 
dynamics of a model towards certain phenomenologies but also update the rule sets according 
to meta-rules that are based on the maximization of different features, e.g., Mori et al. (1998), 
use a meta-rule set that relies on a parameterization of the frequency with which changes in 
the state of a cell lead to changes in its nearest-neighbours’ states.  
I maintain that genetic modelling can also be interpreted as horizontal model 
construction. The model eventually constructed is the final evolution of the genetic algorithm. 
As in the case of rule space parsing, the use of genetic algorithms is an automated way of 
horizontally constructing models. In contrast to rule space parsing, which generates 
comprehensive lineages of models that include all possible models with a given type of rule 
set, genetic algorithms provide a way of targeting this construction towards the generation of 
models that have particular phenomenologies. The lineages constructed in this way are 
usually not permanent: the end result of a run with a genetic algorithm is a single model, 
which best fulfils the criteria specified by the meta-rule set.  
The generation of a model through the use of a genetic algorithm is clearly not based on 
the use of governing theory and empirical knowledge about a target system. This is also 
evident in the works cited in this section (e.g., Packard and Wolfram, 1985; Langton, 1990; 
Chambers, 1995; Mori et al., 1998), which do not mention any specific target systems for the 
models they obtain. Accordingly, I maintain (i) that the use of genetic algorithms is a way of 
horizontal model construction and (ii) that, like rule space parsing, it constitutes a significant 
part of the modelling activity in complexity science. Both the genetic algorithms and the 
models they create then become part of the repository.  
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Cataloguing and analysing the repository   The methodologies used for the 
horizontal construction of models, rule space parsing and genetic algorithms, necessarily lead 
to the generation of a very large number of models. Not all of these models have 
phenomenologies that are judged to be interesting. Models with particularly interesting 
phenomenologies are usually given the label ‘complex’. However, this should not indicate 
that only these models are used in complexity science: CAs creating random or ordered 
patterns (e.g., the Sierpinski triangle) have also been of interest to complexity scientists (e.g., 
Wolfram, 2002) and have also been transferred to specific target systems (Batty, 2005, 
Section 4.2). Accordingly, I maintain that the activity of bestowing different labels on the 
models generated through large-scale horizontal modelling is best interpreted as a cataloguing 
of models in the repository. 
Such cataloguing is usually based on phenomenological criteria. For example, Wolfram 
(1983b) introduces a classification scheme for CAs, which sorts these models into four classes 
based on their behaviour: homogeneous (class I), periodic (class II), chaotic (class III), and 
complex (class IV). The scheme has been used in later works by the same author (e.g., 
Wolfram, 1984, 2002) and has also been widely adopted in the complexity science 
community (e.g., Langton, 1990; Packard and Wolfram, 1985; Mori et al., 1998).  
The question of how the term ‘complex’ should be defined is currently unresolved (e.g., 
for recent philosophical reviews of this debate, Ladyman et al., 2013; Zuchowski, 2012). 
However, in practice, the classification has been performed with relative ease. In fact, many 
practitioners assume that the identification of models with complex behaviour can be 
performed intuitively through visual inspection (e.g., Gershenson, 2008, p. 131).  
Despite the fact that the cataloguing of models in the repository appears to be mostly 
based on intuition, the phenomenologies of complex models have been investigated 
extensively. Such investigations include the computation of entropy measures (e.g., Wolfram, 
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1984, 2002) as well as the development and application of new statistical measures to capture 
the characteristics of differently classified models (e.g.,  Shalizi, 2001).   
 
4.2.  Transfer and extension of models 
In this section, I will discuss the transfer of complex models from the repository to a given 
target system. My framework for the analysis of the transfer of models is the one developed in 
Section 3, i.e., I conceptualize the transfer process as consisting of the two steps of 
phenomenological prompting and dynamical reinterpretation.  Furthermore, I will maintain 
that the transfer of models is often followed by the vertical construction of additions and 
adaptions to these models.  
 
Transfer of models  As described above, the division of modelling work into the 
large-scale horizontal construction of models and the transfer of these models to particular 
target systems is clearly illustrated in the structure of Wolfram (2002): the first part of the 
book (Chapters 1–5) presents a multitude of generic models constructed through rule space 
parsing, then there is an interlude in which these models are catalogued and analysed 
(Chapters 6–7), and in the second part of the book (Chapters 8–11) areas of application for 
these models are then sketched out.  
The transfer of complex models into other scientific fields appears to have been most 
successful in those cases, in which a direct analogy can be constructed between the 
phenomenology of the model and the phenomenology of the systems investigated in these 
fields. This highlights the importance of the first step of the transfer process, 
phenomenological prompting: without completion of this step, the second step, a 
reinterpretation of the models dynamics, will not take place. The areas in which the 
recognition of such phenomenological similarities has been possible are fields like population 
dynamics, including the morphology of genetic traits, urban development, sociology, and 
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physical morphology. In all of these areas, a reinterpretation of the discrete-time, grid-based 
dynamics of the relevant models has also been possible.  
The adaption and use of CAs, i.e., the transfer of models from the repository of models 
provided by e.g., Wolfram (2002), to represent urban development can be illustrated in the 
cases presented by Batty (2005). The book begins with a general introduction of the models to 
be used in later chapters, which leaves no doubt that the use of models from complexity 
science, and of CAs in particular, was prompted by the recognition of similarities in the 
patterns visible in the phenomenologies of CAs and in the spatial pattering of cities (p. 9, pp. 
108-110, p. 141, p. 90). In particular, Batty (2005, pp. 1-6) argues that the localized pattering 
displayed by complex (class IV) CAs (Section 4.1) can be interpreted as analogous to the 
localized clustering seen in the ‘urban sprawl’ of modern cities. It is stressed that CAs will be 
better able to generate these forms of urban development than models relying on the 
assumption of centralized planning and zoning (Chapter 1).  
Batty (2005, Chapter 2) introduces a number of different CAs. Batty (2005, e.g., p. 7, p. 
72) thereby extensively refers to Wolfram (2002) and the Game of Life. The models are then 
assigned to specific target systems according to their phenomenologies: deterministic CAs 
that create regular patterns are assigned to planned cities with a regular development (pp. 90), 
while complex CAs with probabilistic dynamics are assigned to organically grown cities (pp. 
90-96). Thereby, the states of the CA are interpreted as various states of the 
development/residing population of a given spatial unit (e.g., p. 24, p. 69).  
Once these target systems have been assigned, the dynamics of the models are then 
reinterpreted to fit the given scenario, i.e., the analogy is extended to the dynamics and the 
second step of the transfer process is concluded. In the case of regular CA development, the 
rule set is seen as an implementation of the rules of town layouts that govern planned cities (p. 
90). In the case of probabilistic CAs, the probabilistic transition rule is interpreted as 
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reflecting “uncertainty about the decision in question or variety in preference”, i.e., the fact 
that in non-planned cities no deterministic rule for their development is strictly upheld.  
Throughout the book, this process is repeated for various, increasingly complicated rule 
sets. It is important to note that these rule variations are seen as being chosen from an existing 
set of rules and not as being developed from the natural process through vertical modelling. 
This also becomes apparent in Batty (2005, pp. 110-116), where four general types of rules 
are listed (pattern rules, counting rules, statistic rules, voting rules). The various models in the 
book are then obtained – at least initially – through the reinterpretation of particular examples 
of these basic rule sets. This can be rephrased in the terminology of this paper as the transfer 
of a model from the general repository of models (Section 4.1).  
 
Vertical construction of extensions   The transfer of complex models is not the 
only modelling activity discernible in Batty (2005). Rather, the part of the book devoted to 
modelling with CAs is divided into two subparts: in the first three chapters, any models 
assigned to specific urban development scenarios are virtually exclusively obtained through 
the reinterpretation of well-known cellular automata, i.e., through the transfer of models from 
the repository. However, in chapter 4, these models are then developed further. For example, 
Batty (2005, pp. 156-162) constructs a model of urban development that is based on the 
interaction between the potential for development and the actual development of a given area. 
This construction starts with a consideration of how these two parameters interact in actual 
cities (pp. 156-157; Figure 41), and then proceeds to the design of a set of rules for a 
probabilistic CA. Batty (2005, p. 156) calls this example of model construction “modelling 
with extended cellular automata”, which seems to be an apt description: we can interpret this 
process of model construction as the extension of a model, which has previously been 
obtained through transfer from the general repository. The construction of these extensions 
appears to be an example of vertical model construction rather than of mere reinterpretation. 
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A similar combination of model transfer followed by extension of the transferred model 
through vertical construction can also be seen in the second part of Batty (2005): this part 
begins with a general review of ABMs, including their use in other fields of science, e.g., in 
geography for the modelling of river systems (pp. 222-223). Similarities between the 
phenomenologies of the ABMs and the morphology of cities are then identified (pp. 223-
240). The ABMs introduced before are then reinterpreted as settlement models, by 
interpreting the agents as populations (p. 241). Lastly, the existing models are extended by 
additions to their dynamics.  
The adaption and extension of ABMs in Batty (2005) also illustrates that these 
extensions can be extensive and combine elements from different classes of models (Section 
4): the dynamics of the ABMs is eventually extended to include an underlying morphology of 
resources which can be altered through the agent’s actions (pp. 252-257). The interaction 
between the resources and the agents is governed through a feedback loop (p. 255) that 
includes elements from game-theoretical models.  
Due to the textbook character of Batty (2005), this interplay between different 
modelling activities is clearly displayed in the book. A recent collection of articles in which 
the transfer, adaption and use of complex models in different areas of the natural and social 
sciences are discussed is Hooker (2011). The examples discussed in this collection range from 
the use of ABMs to model the natural selection of biological traits (Harms, 2011), to the use 
of network models to model interactions in economic exchange systems (Foster, 2011), to the 
use of network models to study the development of linguistic categories (Lansing and 
Downey, 2011). The prevalence of the transfer and adaption of complex models,  as well as 
the interplay between such transfers and the horizontal construction of models (Section 4.1), 
is also evident in the research areas listed by institutes like the Santa Fe Institute or The 
Bristol Centre for Complexity Science, which include the use of complex models in several of 
the natural and social sciences. Shorter research papers often focus on either one of these 
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activities, i.e., they either discuss the vertical construction of novel extensions to models that 
have already been transferred to a specific target system or they focus on identifying specific 
models that could be used to represent a given phenomenon (e.g., for a collection of such 
studies, Bandini et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the general interplay of modelling activities is still 
discernible in such studies. It is also apparent from a survey of such papers that the transfer 
and extension of models in complexity science is mostly undertaken by natural and social 
scientists that are interested in the exploration of particular target systems in other fields of 
science and would therefore profess allegiance to these fields as well.  
 
Cross-disciplinary transfer  Batty (2005) also contains examples of the second 
transfer mechanism operating within the auxiliary regions of complexity science, e.g., the 
transfer of a model with a given target system to another target system, often located in a 
different discipline. One such example is the use of sugarscape models, i.e., the extension of 
an ABM to include an underlying morphology of resources that the agents interact with in 
complicated ways: this class of ABMs was initially added to the repository of models at the 
core of complexity science by Langton (1989); it was inspired by a simple resource 
distribution models in biology, subsequently used to investigate the behaviour of artificial 
life-forms, and eventually transferred on to represent social phenomena (Batty, p. 252). This 
chain of transfers and adaptions also illustrates the often complicated history of models in 
complexity science.  
 
Explanatory role of transferred models   As outlined in Section 3, the transfer and 
reinterpretation of a model leads to the provision of a ‘how possibly’ explanation for the 
occurrence of the phenomenon under question. Accordingly, modelling in complexity science 
often begins with a ‘how possible’ explanation. However, this explanation is then further 
scaffolded by additional evidence gained during the extension of the model through vertical 
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construction, i.e., it is shown that an extended version of the model can be constructed from 
direct considerations of the natural processes in questions. This provides support for a 
transformation of a ‘how possible’ explanation into a ‘how actually’ explanation.  
The explanatory power of complex models is therefore difficult to capture: at heart, 
these models provide ‘how possible’ explanations, since their initial transfer is 
phenomenologically prompted. However, in the course of further modelling studies, adaptions 
and extensions are added that have been constructed from a-priori dynamical considerations. 
The more such extensions have been added to a model, the more evidence for the 
consideration of a model’s dynamics as an ‘how actually’ explanation appears to exist. 
Accordingly, my view of modelling in complexity science is very well compatible with an 
account that locates the explanatory powers of models on a continuum spectrum between 
‘how possible’ and ‘how actually’ explanations (e.g., Bokulich, 2014).  
As described in Section 1, I view the transfer of models as part of complexity science. 
However, compared to the creation and maintenance of the repository (Section 4.1), these 
activities are best visualized as delineating auxiliary areas of the field, which overlap with 
other scientific fields and form the interdisciplinary part of complexity science. Similarly, 
practitioners engaged in this activity often view themselves as being part of both complexity 
science and another, primary field (e.g., Batty, 2005).  
 
5.  Conclusion  
In this paper, I analysed the construction and transfer of models in complexity science. 
Thereby, I introduced a distinction between vertical and horizontal model construction 
(Section 2). Vertical models (Section 2.1) are constructed top-down or bottom-up from 
empirical knowledge about the target system and from general governing theory. Therefore, 
the existence of a specific target system is a prerequisite of vertical model construction. In 
contrast, horizontal model construction (Section 2.2) is the construction of a model without 
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reference to a specific target system. It usually involves the generation of a variation of an 
existing model through changes of the mathematical formalism, which are usually motivated 
by investigative reasons. 
My framework for the discussion of model transfer in complexity science is based on 
the account of the identification of analogies between different models by Hesse (1966). I 
maintained (Section 3) that the transfer of models in complexity science is prompted by a 
recognition of similarities between the phenomenology of a model and the phenomenology of 
a new target system. I named his step in the transfer process ‘phenomenological prompting’. 
Once these similarities have been recognized the dynamics of the model are also reinterpreted 
to suit the new target system. I named this step in the transfer process ‘dynamical 
reinterpretation’. Accordingly, my analysis is based on the assumption that the transfer of a 
model to a new target system can be conceptualized as a two-step process. 
I then argued that all three types of modelling activity are part of the defining 
methodology of complexity science: vertical construction, horizontal construction and model 
transfer (Section 4). In particular, I argued that these modelling activities can be divided into 
two general categories: (i) the creation of a repository of models without specific target 
systems, which have been created by large-scale horizontal construction (Section 4.1), and (ii) 
the transfer of these models to particular target systems in the natural and (to a lesser degree) 
the social sciences, which can also be followed by an extension of the transferred model 
through vertical construction of adaptions and additions to its dynamics (Section 4.2). 
Additional transfers of such models to new target systems, often in the social sciences, are 
also frequent in complexity science but have not been the focussed on in this paper.  
In category (i), I identified two prevalent methodologies of horizontal model 
construction: rule-space parsing and the use genetic algorithm. Rule space parsing is the 
systematic creation of models by an automated generation of all possible sets of dynamics for 
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a class of models; the use of genetic algorithms is the automated optimization of the dynamics 
of a class of models towards the display of particular phenomenological features. 
The use of these methodologies for large-scale horizontal model construction appears to 
be a distinguishing feature of complexity science. Their automated nature means that large 
numbers of models without specific target system can be constructed and evaluated, i.e., a 
repository of models with well analysed dynamics and phenomenologies is created through 
this mode of modelling.  
I also analysed category (ii), the transfer of models from the repository to specific target 
systems and the further development of these models through vertical construction. I argued 
that transfer of complex models is phenomenologically prompted, i.e., that the transfer of 
models in complexity science follows the two-step conceptualization developed in Section 3. 
Furthermore, once a model’s transfer is completed, i.e., once both the model’s 
phenomenology and its dynamics have been reinterpreted, the model is often extended 
through the construction of additions and adaptions. The construction of such extensions is 
usually based on empirical knowledge about the model’s new target system and on the 
general theory that governs its dynamics: they are therefore vertically constructed. 
Accordingly, the modelling of a specific target system in complexity science often involves 
both model transfer as well as the vertical construction of models. In addition, these models 
can also be transferred to new target systems in different disciplines.  
The division between the two categories of modelling activities also marks an epistemic 
division of labour: the creation of the repository of models appears to be mostly undertaken 
by mathematicians and computer scientists while the transfer and extension of models is 
undertaken by natural and social scientists. In Section 1, Section 4.1 and Section 4.2, I have 
argued that this interplay of modelling activities can be seen as providing a methodological 
definition of complexity science, namely it delineates a methodological core area of the field 
– the stocking, investigation and cataloguing of the repository – and a number of auxiliary 
	 31	
areas characterized by the transfer of models from the repository to target system in different 
areas of the natural and social sciences. In these areas, complexity science overlaps both 
methodologically and in the self-identification of the practitioners with other scientific fields. 
Additional auxiliary areas can also be added to complexity science through the onward 
transfer of models from one target system to another. This mechanism seems to be the 
primary way in which areas in the social sciences are methodologically connected to the core 
area of complexity science, while the direct transfer from the repository, which this paper has 
been focussed on, tends to tie in areas in the natural sciences.    
Accordingly, the specific interaction of the different modelling activities in complexity 
science provides a mechanism for the transfer of knowledge between these different fields. In 
addition to the formal structure of a model, the transfer also involves gaining a ‘how possibly’ 
explanation for the new target system’s phenomenology. The explanatory power of the model 
can be increased if additional vertical adaptions and alterations are made: the certainty of the 
knowledge gained through a transfer, as measured on a spectrum between ‘how possible’ and 
‘how actually’ explanation, therefore depends on the given models similarity to the target 
system and on the possible further alterations to the model.  
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